Theory formation by abduction : initial results of a case study based on the chemical revolution by O'Rorke, Paul et al.
UC Irvine
ICS Technical Reports
Title
Theory formation by abduction : initial results of a case study based on the chemical 
revolution
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0007w7pb
Authors
O'Rorke, Paul
Morris, Steven
Schulenburg, David
Publication Date
1989-08-09
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
Theory Formation by Abductioi^
"^Initial Results of a Case Study
Based on the Chemical Revolution^
Paul^'Rorke, (ororke@ics.uci.edu)
Steveii Morris (morris@ics.uci.edu)
David Schulenburg (schulenb@ics.uci.edu)
Information and Computer Science Department
University of California, Irvine
Irvine, CA 92717
(Technical Report Number 89-25)
August 9, 1989
Z
03
c.'z
Notice; This Wiateriai
may be protected
by Copyright Law
(Title 17 U.S.G.)
^To appear as a chapter in J. Shrager a,nd P. Langley (Eds), "Computational Models of Scientific
Discovery and Theory Formation." This paper is based on work supported in part by an Irvine Faculty
Fellowship from the University of California, Irvine Academic Senate Committee on Research and by grant
number IRI-8813048 from the National Science Foundation to the first author.

Abstract
Abduction is the process of constructing explanations. This chapter suggests that au
tomated abduction is a key to advancing beyond the "routine theory revision" methods
developed in early AI research towards automated reasoning systems capable of "world
model revision" — dramatic changes in systems of beliefs such as occur in children's cog
nitive development and in scientific revolutions. The chapter describes a general approach
to automating theory revision based upon computational methods for theory formation by
abduction. The approach is based on the idea that, when an anomaly is encountered, the
best course is often simply to suppress parts of the original theory thrown into question
by the contradiction and to derive an explanation of the anomalous observation based on
relatively solid, basic principles. This process of looking for explanations of unexpected
new phenomena can lead by abductive inference to new hypotheses that can form crucial
parts of a revised theory. As an illustration, the chapter shows how some of Lavoisier's key
insights during the Chemical Revolution can be viewed as examples of theory formation
by abduction.
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1 World Model Revision
Much of the recent progress in AI has been characterized by the slogan in the knowledge
lies the power (Feigenbaum, 1979). The performance of AI systems has become more
impressive as the systems have become increasingly knowledge-intensive. Unfortunately,
knowledge-intensive systems are bound to exhibit imperfect behavior when they are based
upon imperfect knowledge. Existing AI systems often exhibit fragility or brittleness as a
result. For this reason, revision methods are needed to correct and extend knowledge that
is incorrect or incomplete.^
"Routine belief revision" methods already exist as a result of progress in AI research.
Automated reasoning systems have used methods such ascontradiction backtracing (Shapiro,
1981) and dependency-directed backtracking, and subsystems such as Truth-Maintenance
Systems (Doyle, 1979) in a large number of tasks requiring simple changes in systems of
beliefs.
We all make simple changes in beliefs during everyday life, but dramatic changes in
systems of beliefs such as occur in scientific revolutions appear to require extraordinary
creative genius. This sort of "world model revision" is at the more difficult, more creative
end of the spectrum of belief revision problems.^ Great changes in our way of looking at
the world represent the height of human intellectual achievement and are identified with
intellectual giants such as Galileo, Newton, Lavoisier, and Einstein.
Until recently, it has not been clear how to advance toward reasoning systems capable
of world model revision. The claim of this chapter is that computational methods for
theory formation by abduction can provide a basis for world model revision. Abduction is
the process of constructing explanations (Peirce, 1931-1958; Pople, 1973; Reggia & Nan,
1984; Reggia, Nan, & Wang, 1983; Reggia, Perricone, Nan, k Peng, 1985; Josephson,
Chandrasekaran, Smith, & Tanner, 1987; Schank, 1986; Charniak, 1988). This chapter
focuses on a theory-driven form of abduction which can be used to derive explanations of
anomalous observations, given rules and facts encoding a general theory and the details
of a specific situation. If a prediction of a given theory contradicts an observation, the
approach to revision advocated here involves explaining the observation in terms of basic
principles. We claim that the process of finding an explanation can lead by abductive
inference to new hypotheses that can form crucial parts of new theories.
To support this claim, we givein the remainder of this chapter a detailed descriptionof
a computer simulation viewing one of Lavoisier's key insights in the Chemical Revolution
as an example of theoryformation by abduction. In Section 2 we present some background
^Note that in this paper, "knowledge-base", "model", "theory", and "belief system" are used as roughly
interchangeable terms since knowledge-bases can be viewed as models, theories, or sets of beliefs.
^McDermott and Doyle first made the distinction between routine belief revision and world model
reorganization. In (McDermott & Doyle, 1980) they also present a modal approach to the formalization
of non-monotonic reasoning and routine belief revision.
on this particular world model revision. Then in Section 3 we show how advances in quali
tative physics provide a language for representing some aspects of chemical processes in the
form of rules and facts. In Section 4 we discuss our overall framework for theory revision.
In particular, we discuss how abduction can provide a means for theory formation. In
Section 5, we illustrate how our abduction method generates qualitative chemical explana
tions. These sections then put us in a position to show in Section 6 how an observation in
conflict with the phlogiston theory can lead via abduction to hypotheses that correspond
to a key insight that contributed to Lavoisier's revolutionary shift to an oxygen theory of
combustion. Section 7 gives a brief summary, and Section 8 discusses related work.
2 The Chemical Revolution
James Bryant Conant argues in his introduction to the Harvard case histories in experi
mental science (Conant, Nash, Roller, & Roller, 1957) that ca.se studies of revolutionary
advances in science can facilitate the understanding of science by non-scientists. Cognitive
scientists take this one step further and argue that case studies based on the history of
science can be used to achieve a deeper understanding of the cognitive processes under
lying scientific discovery (see, e.g., Bradshaw, Langley, & Simon, 1983; Langley, Simon,
Bradshaw, & Zytkow, .1987). One immediate aim of such case studies of scientific revolu
tions is to develop computational models of the evolution of specific scientific theories over
time. However, the ultimate goal is not so much to capture individual case histories, but
to improve our understanding of how theory shifts are, or can be, made.
In this chapter, we present some initial results of a case study of the Chemical Revolu
tion — the replacement of the phlogiston theory by the oxygen theory (1775 - 1789). This
particular theory shift has attracted a great deal of interest partly because it occurred in
the early days of chemistry, while the theories and experiments were still close to common
knowledge and everyday experience. In addition, a great deal is known about the Chemi
cal Revolution because of detailed records left by the scientists involved and thanks to the
large number of books and papers on the subject by historians and philosophers of science
(see for example, Guerlac, 1961; Thagard in press-a; Ihde, 1980; in addition to Conant,
1957).
Prior to the Chemical Revolution, the phlogiston theory of chemistry provided the pre
dominant explanation for the processes of combustion and calcination. Under this theory,
developed by the German chemist G. E. Stahl (1660 - 1734), it was thought that all com
bustible substances contained an element called phlogiston. Combustion was thought of as
a flow of phlogiston from the combustible substances into the surrounding air. Calcination
is an alchemists' term for the process of changing things to calx or powder by applying heat.
It also applies to rusting (now called oxidation) and was thought of as a loss of phlogiston
from metals.^ The phlogiston theory thus predicts a decrease in the weight of combusting
and calcining substances. Consequently, Lavoisier, the 18th century French chemist who
was the chief protagonist in the chemical revolution, placed great importance on the ob
servation that the weights of some substances increase when they undergo combustion and
calcination. Just after this "augmentation" effect was demonstrated conclusively, Lavoisier
deposited a sealed note on November 1, 1772 with the Secretary of the French Academy
of Sciences:
About eight days ago I discovered that sulfur in burning, far from losing weight,
on the contrary, gains it; it is the same with phosphorus... This discovery,
which I have established by experiments, that I regard as decisive, has led me to
think that what is observed in the combustion of sulfur and phosphorus may well
take place in the case of all substances that gain in weight by combustion and
calcination; and I am persuaded that the increase in weight of metallic calxes
is due to the same cause.^
Lavoisier went on to discover that, contrary to the century old phlogiston theory, a gas
contained in the atmosphere combines with burning combustibles and calcining metals.
This gas was first isolated by heating "mercurius calcinatus" (red calx of mercury; now
called red oxide of mercury) until the gas in the calx was liberated. Lavoisier named the
new gas "oxygen."
3 Representing Qualitative Chemical Knowledge
In this section, we show how advances in research onqualitative physics provide a language
for describing some important ideas associated with the Chemical Revolution. The first
subsection shows a qualitative process schema for combustion according to the phlogiston
theory. The following subsections show how some of the ideas associated with qualitative
physics and with phlogiston can be encoded in terms of facts and rules. This encoding
is needed in later sections describing the construction of explanations of observations in
volving changes in the weights of burning and calcinating substances. In particular, in
Section 5 we will illustrate our abduction method by showing how a fragment of the phlo
giston theory explains and predicts the loss in weight of charcoal after combustion. This
preliminary material will put us in position to describe Lavoisier's initial revolutionary
insight as an example of abductive inference (in Section 6).
"•Calx is the ashy powder left after a metal or mineral has been calcined. It is the same as rust, a coating
or film formed on metals by corrosion or calcination. The reddish rust that appears on iron exposed to air
and moisture is the most familiar example.
^Translation by Conant (1957). The dots indicate text omitted by the authors.
Process: combustion Individual-view; complex-stuff
Individuals: Individuals:
combustible a complex-stuff complex a substance
phlogiston a simple-stuff {Sj | S,- a substance}
air a gas Preconditions:
Preconditions: components({S,}, complex)
~wet(combustible) QuantityConditions:
component-of(phlogiston, combustible) y Sj E {S.}, A[amount-of-in(Sj, complex)] > ZERO
surrounds(air, combustible) Relations'
QuantityConditions: There is p G piece-of-stuff
A[temp(combustible)] > A[flashpoint(combustible)] made-of(p. complex)
A[amount-of-in(phlogiston, combustible)] > ZERO amount-of-infS,-, p) = amountfp)
A[amount-of-in(phlogiston, air)] <
A[capacity-of-for(air, phlogiston)]
Relations:
Let combustion-rate be a quantity
combustion-rate 0C+ (A[capacity(air, phlogiston)] — A[amount-of-in(phlogiston, air)])
combustion-rate oc^ amount-of-in(phlogiston, combustible)
Influences:
I —(amount-of-in(phlogiston, combustible), A[combustion-rate])
I -f (amount-of-in(phlogiston, air), A[combustion-rate])
Figure 1: A Qualitative Process Description of the Phlogiston Theory of Combustion
3.1 A Qualitative Process Description of Combustion
Qualitative Process (QP) Theory (Forbus, 1984) provides a language for describing quali
tative changes due to processes acting on quantities. Figure 1 shows a QP representation
of a fragment of Stahl's phlogiston theory. This representation is intended to capture the
phlogiston theorist's notion that combustion is similar to a "flow" of phlogiston from a
combustible substance to the surrounding air.
In QP theory processes are represented as frames or schemata called qualitative process
descriptions. These frames contain knowledge about the objects (individuals) involved
in the process, as well as speciflc knowledge about the process itself. Objects are also
described using additional frames known as individual views.
The individuals slot of a QP schema specifies the objects associated with a process or
individual view. In the qualitative description of combustion, the individuals include a
piece of some combustible substance (e.g., a chunk of charcoal), a piece of phlogiston, and
a volume of air. In the individual view of complex-stuff, the relevant individuals include
some complex substance and a set of component substances.
Among other things, the preconditions slot of the combustion schema captures the
phlogiston theorist's belief that only complex substances can burn. According to phlogiston
Direct Influences:
GLl; deriv-sign(Ql, Sign) <— process(Process), active(Process), influence(Process, Ql, Sign).
Indirect Influences:
GL2a: deriv-sign(Ql, Sign) qprop(Ql, Q2, pos), deriv-sign(Q2, Sign).
GL2b: deriv-sign(Ql, Signl) qprop(Ql, Q2, neg), deriv-sign(Q2, Sign2), opposite(Signl, Sign2).
The Law of Sums:
GL3: qprop(Q, Q,-, pos) <— qty-eq(Q, qty-sum(Qs)), member(Q,-, Qs).
Figure 2: Some General Laws of Qualitative Physics Encoded as Rules
theory, all combustibles are compounds containing the element phlogiston. The quantity-
conditions state that in order for combustion to occur, the combustible must be "hot
enough"; there must be some phlogiston in the combustible; and the surrounding air
must not be "saturated" by phlogiston. The relations state that the combustion rate is
qualitatively proportional to the remaining capacity of the air for phlogiston and to the
phlogiston content of the combustible substance. The influences state that phlogiston is
leaving the combustible and "escaping" into the air, and that this flow is directly influenced
by the combustion-rate.
The individual view of complex-stuff states that there is a set of substances, namely
the components of the complex stuff, and that the sum of the amount of each of these
substances equals the amount of the piece of complex stuff.
3.2 Some General Laws of Qualitative Physics Encoded as Rules
The qualitative process description of the phlogiston theory of combustion sketched in the
previous subsection is intended to capture a number of inferences and explanations made
by phlogiston theorists. In the remainder of this chapter, we will focus on explanations
accounting for changes in the weight of substances during burning and calcination. This
subsection presents some basic laws of qualitative physics relevant to these explanations.
The next subsection focuses on a portion of the phlogiston theory of combustion implicit
in the QP schemata of the previous subsection.
3.2.1 The Law of Direct Influences
In Figure 2, rules GLl, GL2, and GL3 are general laws of QP theory.
GLl, the law of direct influences^ states that a quantity may be changing because some
process is directly influencing it. The quantity increases or decreases according to whether
sign is "positive" or "negative."®
®In law GLl, "deriv-sign(Ql) = Sign" means "the sign ofthe derivative with respect to time ofquantity
3.2.2 The Laws of Indirect Influences
The laws of indirect influences (GL2a and GL2b in Figure 2) are meant to capture the
notion that a quantity may change because it is qualitatively proportional to some other
quantity.^ A qualitative proportionality may be either positive or negative. A change in
one quantity may be accounted for by a similar change in some other quantity if there is
a positive qualitative proportionality between them. In the case of a negative qualitative
proportionality, a change in one quantity may be accounted for by an opposite change in
another quantity.
3.2.3 The Law of Sums
The law of sums (GL3 in Figure 2) states that a quantity is qualitatively proportional to
a second quantity if the first quantity is equal to a sum of a number of quantities, one of
which is the second quantity.®
3.2.4 Comments
Note that the "implications" in these "laws" are somewhat ambiguous. The implication in
the "law of sums" should be interpreted as material implication, while the implications in
the "laws of influences" should be interpreted as specifying potential causal associations.
Used in backward chaining, these rules specify possible causes for events. Used in forward
chaining, they predict potential consequences.
Inferences based on the "laws of influences" typically focus on one aspect of a situation
under the assumption that other aspects can be safely ignored. In particular, inferences
involving a change in some quantity ignore other potential influences or proportionalities
involving the affected quantity. In the case of the "laws of indirect influences," a quantity
may be qualitatively proportional to another quantity, and this second quantity may be
changing, but this change does not necessarily completely determine what will happen to
the first quantity. In the case of the "law of direct influences," an active process may be
driving a quantity up or down, but that does not rule out the possibility that there are
other direct or indirect influences acting in the opposite direction.
A classic example of a set of conflicting influences involves a bathtub with a faucet
valve open but with the drain open as well. The water level in the tub is driven upward
by the water flowing in through the faucet but it is simultaneously driven downward by
the water flowing out through the drain. Forward chaining on rules like the ones we have
Q1 is Sign."
^In GL2a, "qprop(Ql, Q2, pos)" means "quantity Q1 is positively qualitatively proportional to quantity
Q2.»
®In GL3, "qty-eq(Q, qty-sum(Qs))" means "Q is a quantity equal to the sum ofquantities Qs," where
Qs is a list of quantities. Also, "member(Qi, Qs)" means "Qi is a member of the list of Qs."
The weight of an object is qualitatively proportional to the amount.
GL4: qprop(weight(P), amount(P), pos).
Combustion is a negative influence on the amount of phlogiston in charcoal.
GL5a: influence(combustion, amount-of-in(phlogiston, charcoal), neg).
Calcination is a negative influence on the phlogiston in mercurius calcinatus.
GL5b; influence(calcination, amount-of-in(phlogiston, m-c), neg).
The amount of a complex substance equals the sum of the amounts
of the components.
GL6; qty-eq(amount(C), qty-sum(Qs)) <— complex(C), is-a-set-of-amounts-of-components-of(Qs, C)
GL7a: is-a-set-of-amounts-of-components-of([Qi | Qs], C) <— is-an-amount-of-a-component-of(Qi, C),
is-a-set-of-amounts-of-components-of(Qs, C).
GL7b: is-a-set-of-amounts-of-components-of([ ], C).
GL8: is-an-amount-of-a-component-of(Qi, C) <— complex(C),
component(Ci, C), Qi = amount-of-in(Ci, C).
Figure 3: Some Key Laws of the Phlogiston Theory
given here could be used to predict possible consequences, e.g.: that the level of the water
in the tub may go up (or down). Alternatively, backward chaining on these rules could be
used to generate possible causes, e.g.: explaining why the level of the water is observed to
increase (or decrease).
3.3 Aspects of the Phlogiston Theory Encoded As Rules
In this subsection, we describe some qualitative laws that capture some important aspects
of the phlogiston theory. These laws, which are shown in Figure 3, fall into two classes. The
first class (comprised of rules GL4, GL6, GL7, and GL8) is concerned with certain basic
properties of substances. Rule GL4 states that the weight of any substance is proportional
to the amount of the substance. Rules GL6, GL7, and GL8 are intended to state that the
amount of a complex substance is equal to the sum of the amounts of its components.
The other class of laws is intended to capture certain aspects of phlogiston theorist's
views on the nature of combustion and calcination. Phlogiston theorists viewed all com
bustible substances as complex substances containing phlogiston. In our qualitative process
description of combustion, rule GL5a states that combustion is a process that influences the
amount of phlogiston in charcoal negatively. That is, if combustion is active it drives down
the amount of phlogiston in a partially burned piece of charcoal. Similarly, Rule GL5b
states that calcination drives down the amount of phlogiston in a partially calcinated piece
of mercury.^
4 Abduction, Hypothesis Formation, and Theory Re
vision
According to Peirce, abduction is explanatory hypothesis generation. Peirce's formulation
of abduction was basically: "The surprising fact, C is observed; But if A were true, C would
be a matter of course, hence there is reason to suspect that A is true." AI researchers
have cited Peirce's notion of abduction as the basis for a number of different methods
and systems. In this section, we describe the particular form of abduction used in our
case study of the Chemical Revolution. Next, we explain how this form of abduction can
be used to generate hypotheses. Then we describe a method that uses this abductive
hypothesis formation capability in theory revision.
4.1 Theory-driven Abduction
The particular form of abduction discussed in this paper is related to the philosophical
view of explanations as deductive arguments where the thing to be explained follows from
a set of general laws and specific facts. Hempel (1965) called explanatory accounts of this
kind "explanations by deductive subsumption under general laws or deductive-nomological
(D-N) explanations. (The root of the term nomological is the Greek word nomos for
law.)" The form of abduction explored here could be considered to be a D-N form of
abduction, viewingexplanations as deductive proofs. The proofs show how observations to
be explained follow from sets of rules and facts encoding general theories and statements
about specific situations.
The theory-driven abduction machinery used here is closely related to theorem provers,
and, in particular, to the standard technique called backward chaining (see, e.g., (Charniak
and McDermott, 1986)). In this technique, a query C9 is used to generate a query A? by
backward chaining on a rule A —^ G. In technical terms, this is done by first unifying the
query C? with the conclusion C of the rule. Unification produces a substitution 9 which
shows how to bind variables in C and C? so as to make them identical. This substitution
is then applied to the antecedent A of the rule. The result, A9, is taken as a new query
A?. This query may "ground out" by unifying with known facts (statements "known to be
true" and given as input to the abduction engine), or it may lead to new queries by way
of additional backward chaining. In using backward chaining for abduction, observations
to be explained are viewed as queries, and general theories and other observations are
®In Figure 3, m-c is an abbreviation for mercurius calcinatus, and stands for a piece of partially
calcinated red calx of mercury.
expressed in terms of rules and facts. Backward chaining is used in an effort to try to
reduce the observations to known facts by way of the rules contained in the theory.
4.2 Abduction and Hypothesis Formation
In order to see how this form of abduction may be used for hypothesis formation, it is
important to distinguish between the process that constructs explanations on the one hand
and the resulting explanations on the other. Explanations may be deductive even when the
process of constructing them is not deductive. A conclusion may follow deductively from a
set of assumptions given the truth of those assumptions but the process of generating the
assumptions required to complete the proof may be non-deductive.
In our particular abduction engine, the process of backward chaining on an observation
produces partial proof trees. The leaves of these trees may or may not correspond to known
facts.
Sometimes backward chaining "grounds out" so that all of the leaves of a proof tree
unify with facts given as part of the input to the abduction engine. In Section 5, a proof is
constructed that explains why the weight of a piece of charcoal goes down as it burns. This
explanation is derived by backward chaining on the rules given in Section 3 describing the
phlogiston theory (such as the rule intended to capture the idea that combustion drives the
amount of phlogiston in a piece of charcoal down). The proof "grounds out" in statements
from this theory and in given statements encoding observations (e.g., that the charcoal is
burning).
When used in constructing explanations, however, backward chaining often fails to pro
duce complete proof trees. In this case, the ungrounded leaves of the partial proof trees
correspond to the explanatory hypotheses generated in Peirce's formulation of abduction.
If the propositions corresponding to these leaves were true, the observation would follow,
and so there is some reason to suspect that they are true — but even if no better expla
nation of the observation can be found, the leap to the conclusion that the explanatory
hypotheses are true is a non-deductive, abductive inference. Section 6 shows how this sort
of abductive hypothesis formation can be used to generate aspects of the oxygen theory
by explaining "augmentation effects" such as the observation that a metallic calx gains
weight in calcination.
4.3 Revising Theories Using Abductive Hypothesis Formation
This subsection sketches our approach to theory revision using abduction hypothesis for
mation. The need for theory revision is typically recognized when a theory is found to
be in contradiction with new observations. The task is ^hen to determine what revisions
will result in a new theory that is in accord with observation. Most approaches to theory
revision involve direct transformations producing the new theory from the original "old"
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theory. These tranformations are generally very much like "editing" or "tweaking." Two
combinatorial problems occur in these transformations. The first involves the identification
of the erroneous subset of the original theory. The second involves the identification of the
correct changes in the erroneous parts of the original theory. In some situations, these
combinatorics are likely to overwhelm editing approaches to theory revision. There seems
to be some evidence that people do not do this sort of editing. In Shrager and Klahr's
"instructionless learning" experiments, subjects were asked to "figure out" devices such as
the BigTrak toy programmable tank.^° Shrager (1987) comments;
... we observed that between interactions with the BigTrak, subjects changed
their theory of the device. A number of empirical generalizations seem to hold
about the nature of these changes... Instead of trying to determine in detail what
led to a failed prediction, subjects usually observed what (positive behavior) took
place and changed their theory according to that observation...
When a surprising observation contradicts a prediction of the original theory, the ap
proach to theory revision explored in the present paper involves retracting questionable
beliefs. However, it is not necessary to start by trying to identify an individual incorrect
belief or even a small set of culprits. Instead, the approach explored in this paper assumes
that the initial theory has some internal structure and that more general fundamental
principles can be separated from relatively specific, less basic statements. A "core" subset
of the original theory, a set of basic statements having nothing to do with the anomaly,
is retained while less central beliefs are suspended. The approach explored here involves
explaining the unexpected new observation in terms of the remaining, relatively solid basic
principles. As we will see in Section 6, this explanation process can generate hypotheses,
suggesting extensions to the basic principles. If these hypotheses are added to the basic
principles, the resulting set of rules and facts is a candidate revised version of the original
theory.
This approach to theory revision is sketched in Figure 4 using Venn diagrams. In
the first stage of theory revision (labeled "1" in the figure) an anomaly is noted. A new
observation contradicts a prediction of the old theory, as indicated by the X linking a point
in the old theory and a point outside of it. In the next stage (labeled "2" in the figure)
the old theory is reduced to the core subset.Starting from this subset, an explanation
of the new observation is abduced with hypotheses being introduced in the process. These
hypotheses then form the basis for extensions to the core theory resulting in a new theory
^°BigTrak is a product of the Milton Bradley Corporation.
Notice that neither the prediction nor the surprising observation are included in the reduced core subset
of the original theory. The circles and ellipses are intended to designate theories closed under deductive
inference. The figure is intended to capture the notion that neither the prediction nor the contradictory
observation should be implications of the core theory.
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Figure 4: Theory Revision Using Abduction for Hypothesis Formation.
(labeled "3" in the figure). This revised theory no longer makes the erroneous prediction
of the old theory.
We do not explore the initial step of falling back on basic principles and shrinking the
original theory in this chapter (the transition from 1 to 2 in Figure 4). Nor do we explore
the evaluation of competing theories such as the original theory and the candidate revision
mentioned above (the theories corresponding to 1 and 3 in Figure 4). Instead, we focus
on the step from 2 to 3 in Figure 4. We concentrate on the claim that the process of
looking for explanations of unexpected new phenomena can lead by abductive inference
to new hypotheses that can form crucial parts of new theories like the oxygen theory of
combustion.
5 Burning Charcoal According to the Phlogiston The
ory
In this section, we illustrate the use of the qualitative physical laws and the phlogiston
theory in the construction of explanations, showing how our own "abduction engine," a
computer program called AbE, generates explanations of an observation by attempting to
reduce it to known facts using general laws. AbE is a PROLOG meta-interpreter that
constructs explanation trees, evaluates partial explanations, and uses best-first heuristic
search. This section shows how AbE constructs an explanation of the drop in the weight
of burning charcoal, in accord with the phlogiston theory.
AbE is given the observation that, upon burning, the weight of some charcoal decreases.
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Observation:
01: deriv-sign(weight(charcoal), neg).
Case facts:
CFl: process(combustion).
CF2: active(combustion).
CF3: compiex(charcoal).
CF4: component(phiogiston, charcoal).
CF5: component(ash, charcoal).
Figure 5: The Weight of Charcoal Decreases As It Burns
This is expressed as a statement (labeled 01 in Figure 5) that the sign of the derivative
of the weight of the charcoal is negative. The system is also given some specific facts
(CFl-5) stating that combustion is occurring and that charcoal is a complex substance
containing phlogiston and ash. (This was the model of charcoal held by the phlogiston
chemists.) In addition, the system is given the general laws of qualitative physics and the
phlogiston theory described earlier (Figures 2 and 3). The system is asked to explain the
observation by using the given laws to connect the observation to the given facts. The
output of the system is a set of proof trees; Figure 6 shows one such tree. In the process
of constructing explanations, the observation is treated as a query which gives rise to new
queries by backward chaining on rules representing logical and causal laws. The remainder
of this section traces the construction of the tree, visiting the nodes in the order shown by
the labels in Figure 6.
The initial query addressed by AbE is why is the weight of the charcoal decreasing?
According to the laws of indirect influences (GL2), a change in some quantity may be
explained by a change in some other quantity provided the two quantities are qualitatively
proportional. This raises the question of whether the decrease in the weight of the charcoal
may be explained in terms of a decrease in some amount that is positively qualitatively
proportional to the weight of the charcoal. The question of whether there is any such
quantity is answered as an instance of the general fact stating that the weight of any
object is positively proportional to the amount of that object (GL4).
At this point, the question is why is the amount of charcoal decreasing? To explain the
decreasing amount of charcoal, the system again attempts to find a positive qualitative
proportionality between the amount ofcharcoal and some other decreasing quantity (using
GL2). An appropriate proportionality is found using the law of sums (GL3). The law of
sums states that some quantity Q is proportional to some other quantity Qi if Q is equal
to the sum of some set of quantities Qs and Qi is a member of that set. In this case, Q is
the amount of charcoal.
The question is now whether there is some set of quantities whose sum is equal to the
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01: deriv-sign(weight(charcoal),neg)
qprop(weight(charcoal),amount(charcoal),neg)
2:GL4
deriv-sign(amount(charcoal),neg)
3:GL2a
qprop(amount(charcoal),amount-of-in(phlogiston, charcoal),pos) deriv-sign(amount-of-in(phlogiston, charcoal),neg)
4:GL3 ^ 8:GL1
complex(ch arcoaI)
6:CF3
influence(combustion, amount-of-in(phlogiston,charcoal), pos)
ll;GL5a
active(calcination)
member(amount-of-ln(phloglston, charcoal), 10:CF2[amount-of-in(phlogiston, charcoal), amount-of-in(ash, charcoal)]) process(calcination)
9:CF1
qty-eq(amount(charcoal), qty-sum([amount-of-in(phlogiston, charcoal), amount-of-in(ash, charcoal)]))
is-a-set-of-amounts-of-components-of([amount-of-in(phlogiston,charcoal),
amount-of-in(ash,charcoal)],charcoal)
7:GL7a
Figure 6: Why the weight of burning charcoal drops.
amount of charcoal. This question is answered in terms of knowledge about complex sub
stances. In particular, the system "knows" that the overall amount of a complex substance
is equal to the sum of the amounts of the components of the substance (GL6). In Figure 6,
the amount of the piece of charcoal is shown as a quantity sum over a list consisting of the
amount of phlogiston in the charcoal, and the amount of ash in the charcoal. This list of
components is actually derived through several applications of rules GL7 and GL8 (which,
if shown in Figure 6, would construct a subtree beginning at node 7). In particular, the
two applications of rule GL8 ground-out using the case facts CF3 (charcoal is a complex
substance), CF4 (phlogiston is a component of charcoal), and CF5 (ash is a component
of charcoal). The result is a proof tree for node 4, which states that the overall amount
of the charcoal is positively qualitatively proportional to the amount of phlogiston in the
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charcoal.
The question now is whether the amount of phlogiston in the charcoal is decreasing.
The law of direct influences (GLl) can be used to explain this decrease, assuming that
an active process can be found to have a negative influence on the amount of phlogiston
in the charcoal. At this point, the system completes its explanation by recognizing that,
according to facts of the case and a key statement in the phlogiston theory, combustion is
an active process that influences the amount of phlogiston in the charcoal negatively.
A similar proof, in which the amount of charcoal is seen as proportional to the amount
of ash, is also generated by AbE. However, this proof cannot be grounded at node 11 via a
direct, negative influence of combustion on the amount of ash, because this influence is not
a fact. Consequently, in the course of its heuristic search, AbE's evaluation function ranks
this incomplete explanation less favorably than the explanation presented in Figure 6.
6 Abduction of Aspects of the Oxygen Theory
We have seen in Section 3, that recent progress in knowledge representation and automated
reasoning makes it possible to capture key ideas contained in early chemical theories such
as the phlogiston theory. In Section 4, we claimed that recent progress on automated ab
duction makes it possible to capture significant aspects of the reasoning that occurred in
the Chemical Revolution. In Section 5, we showed how the representation of a simplified
phlogiston theory and a theory-driven form of abduction can be used to compute expla
nations that seem to capture the phlogiston theorists' views that substances lose weight
when they burn or calcine because they lose phlogiston. This explanation was constructed
by reducing the observation (that a piece of charcoal lost weight) to "known facts" (facts
given to the abduction engine before it started searching for an explanation).^^ It was
claimed in Section 4 that abduction could be used to go beyond deductive inference and
to form the kinds of hypotheses that play crucial roles in major theory shifts.
In this section, we describe how abduction can account for the formation of a crucial
aspect of the oxygen theory. Let us assume as given the phlogiston theory describing the
effects of combustion and calcination shown in Figure 7 and the observation and case facts
shown in Figure 8. Ignore the fact that several items in Figure 7 are crossed out for a
moment. Recall that m-c is an abbreviation for mercurius calcinatus, and stands for a
piece of partially calcinated mercury. According to the phlogiston theory, pure metallic
calxes were more primitive substances than metals. Metals were formed by heating calxes
in the presence of a source of phlogiston such as charcoal; the calxes combined with the
phlogiston to form the metals. On the other hand, metallic calxes resulted when phlogiston,
which was viewed as a "metallizing principle," calcined out of metals.
^^PROLOG could have been easily used to construct the explanation in Section 5.
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The weight of an object is qualitatively proportional to the amount.
GL4: qprop(weight(P), amount(P), pos).
Combustion is a negative influence on the amount of phlogiston in charcoal.
—GL5a;—influanca(combuttioni amount-of-in(phlogi8toni charcoal), nag).
Calcination is a negative influence on the phlogiston in mercurius calcinatus.
—GL5b:—influoncc(calcination, amount of in(phlogiGton, m c), nog).
The amount of a complex substance equals the sum of the amounts
of the components.
GL6; qty-eq(amount(C), qty-sum(Qs)) <— complex(C), is-a-set-of-amounts-of-components-of(Qs, C)
GL7a: is-a-set-of-amounts-of-components-of([Qi | Qs], C) <— is-an-amount-of-a-component-of(Qi, C),
is-a-set-of-amounts-of-components-of(Qs, C).
GL7b: is-a-set-of-amounts-of-components-of([ ], C).
GL8: is-an-amount-of-a-component-of(Qi, C) complex(C),
component(Ci, C), Qi = amount-of-in(Ci, C).
Figure 7: Ablation of the Phlogiston Theory
The phlogiston theory explains and predicts a decrease in the weight of substances
undergoing combustion or calcination. This prediction contradicts the given observation
that the weight of mercurius calcinatus increases during calcination. Assume that, as a
result, questionable parts of the theory and the case facts responsible for the contradiction
have been identified and deleted as indicated by the offending statements crossed out in
Figure 7.^^
Assume, then, that our abduction engine AbE is given the reduced phlogiston theory
shown in Figure 7 and the observation and case facts shown in Figure 7. This reduced
theory and observation make no mention of phlogiston. Phlogiston is no longer considered
to be an essential component of combustible substances and no mention is made of the
effects of combustion or calcination on amounts of phlogiston.
AbE is asked to explain, in terms of the given laws of qualitative physics and the ablated
phlogiston theory, the observation that during calcination (CFl & CF2) the weight of
mercurius calcinatus increases (01). AbE does this by attempting to reduce the observation
to the given facts, but if this is not possible it will propose some hypotheses in an effort
to explain the observation.
Figure 9 shows one explanation arrived at by AbE. This explanation is obviously very
^^Existing contradiction backtracing (Shapiro, 1981) and dependency-directed backtracking methods
(Doyle, 1979) could contribute to identifying candidates for deletion or temporary suppression, but some
method ofevaluating plausibility will be needed in order to decide that a potential culprit should be excised.
Basic principles which contribute to many explanations (e.g., conservation laws) should be preferentially
retained.
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Observations:
01: deriv-sign(weight(m-c), pos).
Case facts:
CFl: process(calcination).
CF2: active(calcination).
Figure 8: The Weight of Calx of Mercury Increases As It Calcinates
similar to the explanation of the decrease in the weight of charcoal according to the phlo
giston theory discussed earlier. We now describe how this explanation was constructed.
The initial query is: Why is the weight of the mercurius calcinatus increasing? This
question is explained in terms of an increase in the amount of the mercurius calcinatus.
Why is the amount of mercurius calcinatus increasing? To explain this, AbE tries
to find a positive qualitative proportionality between the amount of mercurius calcinatus
and some other increasing quantity. An appropriate proportionality is found using the
law of sums (GL3). AbE uses this law to hypothesize that the amount of mercurius
calcinatus is increasing because the amount of one of its components is increasing. Using
laws about complex substances (GL6, GL7, GL8), AbE hypothesizes the existence of an
unknown component of mercurius calcinatus and the existence of an unknown quantity
corresponding to the amount of this component. AbE also hypothesizes that there is a
set of remaining components and associated amounts, without identifying any particular
elements of this set. '^* Unlike the burning charcoal example, in the present case AbE is not
given a case fact stating that mercurius calcinatus is complex. Instead, in using the law of
sums, AbE hypothesizes that mercurius calcinatus is a complex substance.^®
The question now is whether the amount of the unknown component of mercurius calci
natus is increasing. The law ofdirect influences (GLl) can be used to explain this increase,
assuming that an active process can be found to have a positive influence on the ammint
of the component of the mercurius calcinatus. At this point, since calcination is known to
be an active process, AbE completes its explanation by hypothesizing that calcination is
a direct positive influence on the amount of the unknown component.
In the construction of the above explanation only rules and facts of a general nature
were used (such as the rule that a quantity may have changed as a result ofan active process
and the fact that the weight of a substance is qualitatively proportional to its "amount").
'^'These new individuals are represented by Skolem constants generated as a natural consequence of
backward chaining. As shown in Figure 9, the set of the amounts of the components of the lump of mer
curius calcinatus is represented as the list [amount-of-in(_649,m-c) | _702], where .649 is the hypothesized
unknown component, and _702 is the remaining subset of component amounts.
^®Note that the apparently tautological node labeled "8:" in Figure 9 reflects the uniflcation of Qi to
amount-of-in(^49,m-c) in law GL8.
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01: deriv-sign(weight(m-c),pos)
qprop(weight( m-c),amount(m-c),pos)
2:GL4
derlv-slgn(amount(m-c),pos)
3:GL2a
qprop(amount(ni-c),amount-of-in(_649, m-c),pos)
4:GL3
deriv-sign(amount-of-in(_649, m-c),pos)
9:GL1
influence(calcination, amount-of-in(_649, m-c), pos)
active(calcination)
11:CF2
member(amount-of-in(_649, m-c),[amount-of-in(_649, m-c)|_702])
qty-eq(amount(m-c),qty-sum([amount-of-in(_649, m-c)|_702]))
5:GL6
complex(m-c) is-a-set-of-amounts-of-components-of([amount-of-in(_649,m-c)|_702],m-c)
process(calcination)
10:CF1
is-an-amount-of-a-component-of(amount-of-in(_649,m-c)) is-a-set-of-amounts-of-components-of(_702,m-c)
amount-of-in(-649,m-c)=amount-of-in(_649,m-c)complex(m-c) component(.649,m-c)
8:
Figure 9: Why the weight of mercurius calcinatus (m-c) increases in calcination.
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No rules and facts encoding the chemical content of specific qualitative chemical theories
such as the phlogiston or oxygen theory were used. Instead the. basic theory was used to
generate hypotheses corresponding to parts of an oxygen theory by abductive inference
during the construction of an explanation of the augmentation of mercurius calcinatus.
The hypotheses generated are all enclosed in boxes in Figure9. These abductive inferences
correspond to Lavoisier's insight that something was being added during calcination.
Explaining new, surprising observations is a key step in theory revision. In the case of
the Chemical Revolution, Lavoisier's hypothesis that something was added by calcination
to the calx of mercury, in conjunction with experimental results of Priestley and others,
eventually led him to posit the existence ofa hitherto unknown component of air. Lavoisier
called this new theoretical entity "oxygen." Overa long periodof time, he and his followers
worked out a new theory of combustion, calcination, and respiration that displaced the
phlogiston theory. This occurred because chemists of the time were persuaded that the
new theory explained the surprising new augmentation observations (and re-explained old
observations) in a more coherent manner as compared to various patched-up versions of
the phlogiston theory that were proposed by phlogiston theorists.
7 Conclusion
Theory revision can profitably be viewed as a process that involves hypothesis formation
by abduction. When an anomaly is encountered, the best course is often simply to forget
or suppress questionable details of the original theory and to derive an explanation of the
anomalous observation based on more solid, more basic principles. In this way, the process
of looking for explanations of unexpected new phenomena can lead by abductive inference
to new hypotheses that can form crucial parts of a revised theory.
The main result of this paper is that recent progress on abduction and qualitative
process theory makes it possible to automate significant aspects of the reasoning that
occurred in theChemical Revolution. We believe that thelanguage for describing processes
and causal relationships resulting from work on qualitative physics together with inference
mechanisms such as automated abduction will enable automation of many crucial but
relatively common-sense insights associated with scientific revolutions. Ifthis proves true, it
s^SS^sts that automated abduction is a key to advancing beyond "routine theory revision"
towards automated reasoning systems capable of "world model revision."
8 Relation to Other Work
This work is part of a coherent program of research on automated abduction and ma
chine learning underway at Irvine. Our goal is to explore domain-independent models of
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abduction and learning in the context of specific examples and domains involving logical,
psychological, and physical explanations.
• Logical aspects of explanations focus on beliefs, reasons for beliefs, and other logical
relationships between beliefs.
• Psychological explanations involve mental states of intelligent agents, including goals,
intentions, and emotional states; states of the world give rise to states of mind which
in turn lead to actions which change the state of the world.
• Physical explanations involve causal relationships between events occurring in real
or imaginary worlds.
Our previous work on logical explanations includes experimental work on explanation-
based learning in logical domains such as Principia Mathematica (O'Rorke, 1988-b). In
collaboration with Andrew Ortony and Gerald DeJong of Illinois, we are investigating
psychological explanations involving emotions. Initial progress on this research has been
reported by O'Rorke and Cain (1988).
This chapter has described the initial progress of our work involving physical expla
nations. This work is related to, and builds on, work on common-sense reasoning about
the physical world, qualitative physics, and scientific discovery. It fits into the theoretical
framework for learning in physical domains sketched by Forbus and Centner (1986). The
learning taking place in our chemical revolution appears to fit in the third stage ("learning
naive physics") of Forbus and Centner's four stage model.
8.1 STAHL and STAHLP
Recent scientific discovery work by Jan Zytkow and Herbert Simon, followed up by Donald
Rose and Pat Langley, resulted in systems that can automatically detect and correct errors
in chemical theories. These artificial intelligence programs, STAHL (Zytkow & Simon,
1986) and STAHLp (Rose & Langley, 1986), are similar in that they both represent chemical
theories in terms of reaction and component models. A reaction is specified by its input and
output substances; i.e., the substances entering the reaction and the substances resulting
from the reaction. A component model specifies the components of an individual complex
substance as a list of substances.
These systems could conceivably model the shift from the phlogiston to the oxygen
theory as a change from a set of reaction rules and component models involving phlogiston
to a set of reaction rules and component models involvingoxygen. In our opinion, however,
such an account of the theory shift would be incomplete; if only because the models of the
phlogiston and oxygen theories would be incomplete if limited to reactions and component
models. For example, both the phlogiston theory and the oxygen theory explained why a
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flame burning in an enclosed place eventually expires — but their explanations cannot be
expressed solely in terms of component models and reactions.
The inputs to STAHL and STAHLp are reactions. From these reactions, rules are used
to derive new, inferredreactions and component models. An inferred reaction is generated
from a parent reaction by two methods: (1) reduction: a substance that appears on both
sides of the parent reaction is removed on both sides, and (2) substitution: a substance
in the parent reaction is replaced by the components of that substance as specified by its
component model. A component model of a complexsubstance is inferred in one way only:
when an input or inferred reaction has exactly one input substance, the inference is that
the outputs of the reaction specify the components of that substance. Both programs,
using different techniques, carry out belief revision in an incremental fashion; beliefs are
revised when inconsistent sets of reactions or component models are inferred and detected.
We now discuss some aspects of belief revision in STAHL and STAHLp. In STAHL,
inconsistent inputs may lead to the inference of component models that result in infinite
recursion. For example, the following two component models could be inferred:
mercury = calx-of-mercury + phlogiston
calx-of-mercury = mercury + oxygen
Substitution of the second model into the first produces a component model of mercury
that is self-referential, and which leads to infinite recursion:
mercury = mercury + oxygen + phlogiston
STAHL solves this problem by renaming calx-of-mercury in one of the two component
models as "calx-of-mercury-proper." This can be seen as a model of the historical practice
of chemists casting doubt on the proposed identity of a substance in a reported reaction.
This allows the introduction of new substances, but only by way of renaming substances
already mentioned in reactions.
In STAHLp, beliefs are revised when an unbalanced null reaction is inferred. This is
an inconsistent reaction in which either the input or output side has no substances while
the other side has one or more substances. STAHLp corrects this situation by revising its
input reactions. Each revision involves deleting or adding a substance from one side of a
reaction, and an input reaction can have more than one such revision made to it. Belief
revision is effected by identifying a set of revisions of the input reactions that satisfies
two conditions: (1) a balanced reaction will be inferred from the revised input reactions,
and (2) the number of component models that will be changed by the revision is minimal.
Once this revision is identified, all beliefs (inferred reactions and component models) that
depend on the revised input reactions are deleted; then the revisions to the input reactions
are made; and then STAHLp generates the new reactions and component models that
follow from the revised theory. The result of the theory revision can be the elimination or
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modification of previously held component models and inferred reactions, and the addition
of new component models and inferred reactions.
While such revision in STAHLp amounts to hypothesizing the existence of unobserved
substances in the input reactions (adding substances), and retracting previously believed
observations of substances in the input reactions (deleting substances), all such substances
must have been named in previous input reactions. STAHLpis not capable of hypothesizing
the existence of a new substance — one which has not previously appeared in an input to
STAHLp. This is in contrast to the example we have presented in which a new component
substance is hypothesized on the basis of general laws concerning qualitative physics, sums
of quantities, and complex substances.
8.2 COAST and PHINEAS
Closely related AI work by Shankar Rajamoney and Brian Falkenhainer is reported in a
joint paper (Falkenhainer & Rajamoney, 1988) describing their overall approach to the
ory revision. Falkenhainer's system PHINEAS extends abductive hypothesis formation
to include qualitative physical analogies, using the "Structure Mapping Engine" and the
"Qualitative Process Engine." Falkenhainer describes his system PHINEAS in detail in
his Ph.D. thesis (1988). Rajamoney's system COAST revises qualitative physical theo
ries involving processes such as evaporation and osmosis. Rajamoney describes COAST
in detail in his Ph.D. thesis (1988). COAST uses "explanation-based theory revision" to
propose changes in an initial theory in response to an anomaly. Rajamoney's theory re
vision process appears to be an "editing" approach in the following sense. It focuses on
both the prediction of the initial theory and the surprising observation that contradicts
the prediction. Theory revision rules are used to generate ways of changing the initial the
ory so that the prediction is no longer made but the unexpected observation is predicted
instead. An advantage of this "theory debugging" strategy is that the errors in the initial
theory and their corrections are identified together. In related work, he describes a method
for using "exemplars" to guide theory revision. Rajamoney (1989) also uses qualitative
process schemata for a phlogiston theory in an example, but the revisions proposed by his
method are essentially "patches" of the phlogiston theory, the existence of a new substance
(oxygen) is not hypothesized.
8.3 ECHO and PI
Paul Thagard has also done closely related research. Thagard (in press-b) presents a the
ory of explanatory coherence and a connectionist implementation. His program, ECHO, is
given data representing observations and the phlogiston and oxygen theories. Using acti
vation and inhibition links between data and theoretical statements, the program attempts
to determine which of the two theories best "coheres" with the data.
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Thagard's ECHO focuses on the evaluation of existing theories. With regard to the
question of where such theories might have come from in the first place, Thagard hints
that PI (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, h Thagard, 1986) might be able to construct them.
In another paper (Thagard, in press-a), he looks at the conceptual changes that occurred
during the overthrow of the phlogiston theory, and gives a fairly detailed conceptual map
of several important intermediate stages of chemical theory in the transition from the phlo
giston theory to the oxygen theory. In that paper, Thagard suggests that the mechanisms
for concept formation and rule abduction present in PI can be used to form conceptual
networks that can chart the conceptual changes which occurred during the Chemical Rev
olution. Our contribution is that we have shown a detailed example of how abduction
can be used in concert with ideas from work on qualitative physics to make some crucial
inferences associated with the discovery of oxygen.
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